Governments can be accountable for improving the fairness of their priority setting through enhanced transparency and stakeholder engagement. A case analysis is conducted of priority setting in a government health care context in Ontario, Canada, assessing how implementation of hospital accountability agreements meets the conditions of a leading international ethical framework for priority setting, ''accountability for reasonableness'' (A4R). Hospital accountability agreements provide a mechanism for government to ensure that public funding achieves desired performance in hospitals. A key goal of priority setting is fairness. A4R links priority setting, legitimacy, and fairness to theories of democratic deliberation, making a claim for fairness if the four conditions of relevance, publicity, revision/ appeals, and enforcement are satisfied. Regarding the relevance condition, this analysis suggests that government only partially met the relevance condition providing limited stakeholder engagement but with evidence of policy learning and movement toward the establishment of inclusive stakeholder arrangements. Evidence suggests that government eventually progressed toward meeting the publicity condition. Government only partially met the revision/appeals condition and did not meet the enforcement condition, as the other conditions were only partially met. It is our view that regional governance structures in Ontario (i.e., Local Health Integration Networks or LHINs) provide an opportunity for the province to improve the fairness of their accountability agreement processes through enhancing transparency and stakeholder engagement. More broadly, this case study provides a guide for government to enhance accountability by focusing on A4R to improve the fairness of its priority setting.
However, it is often unclear how government arrives at the funding or priority setting decisions it does and how these decisions reflect concern for fairness (Reeleder 2006) .
Legitimacy and fairness are both important and interrelated features of priority setting in health care institutions. Legitimacy refers to the moral authority of institutional actors and may be achieved through fair practices (Daniels and Sabin 2002, 43; Rawls 1993; Singer et al. 2000) . Fairness is a key goal of priority setting, and legitimate decision makers may act fairly or unfairly. For example, government in a democratically elected democracy can choose to emphasize transparency and stakeholder engagement in limit-setting decisions, or it can choose to restrict options to engage others in order to achieve short-term results (Ham and McIver 2000) . Sabin (1997, 2002) have proposed an ethical framework for priority setting in health care institutions called ''accountability for reasonableness'' (A4R), which links priority setting, legitimacy, and fairness to theories of democratic deliberation (Holm 1998) . Recognized internationally as a leading framework for evaluating the fairness of limit-setting decisions (Ham and Robert 2003) , A4R makes a claim for fairness if priority setting satisfies four conditions: relevance, publicity, revision/appeals, and enforcement (table 1) . It has been used to review decision making in a variety of health-related environments, particularly hospitals. Studies to date of individual hospitals have pointed out the feasibility of assessing features of hospital operations through the lens of A4R. While pointing out limitations in fairness and priority setting due to lack of transparency and stakeholder engagement, individual studies have not, to our knowledge, directly assessed government's involvement in specific instances of health care priority setting (Bell et al. 2004; Gibson, Martin, and Singer 2005; Martin, Shulman, et al. 2003) .
The purpose of this study is to review a recent case concerning hospital policy reform initiatives in Ontario, Canada, and to explore, for the first time, how government priority setting aimed at implementation of hospital accountability agreements is aligned to the conditions of A4R. Globally there is a movement toward greater accountability of our public institutions, and this study provides a case example on how this may be achieved in a health care setting.
METHODS
A case analysis approach is used (Denzin and Lincoln 2000, 435; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 43; Yin 1994 ) to describe and evaluate accountability agreement design and implementation for the Ministry of Health in Ontario, Canada, from January 2004 to March 2005, using evidence accessible in the public domain. A multiple and directed electronic search strategy was used to obtain evidence from Ontario government Web site databases, the Ontario Hospital Association (and associated Joint Policy and Planning Committee [JPPC] ) Web site database, the Government of British Columbia, and relevant Canadian newspaper articles.
The Ontario government Web site was searched for hospital financial information (Ministry of Finance) and Local Health Integration Network (LHIN), accountability agreements, relevant legislation, and prior hospital restructuring information (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care). The Ontario Hospital Association and JPPC Web sites were reviewed for information on ''accountability agreements,'' ''hospital budgets,'' ''funding,'' and ''regional sessions.'' Information from the JPPC pointed to accountability agreement developments in another leading provincial jurisdiction, British Columbia. The British Columbia government Web site was searched for information on ''accountability'' and ''performance agreements.'' Concerning media articles, the Globe and Mail, Canada's oldest English national newspaper (Globe and Mail-2002 weekly circulation of 2,085,115), and the Toronto Star (circulation 3,337,467) were electronically searched for the period under question, using search words ''budgets,'' ''funding shortfalls,'' ''Ontario hospitals,'' and ''accountability agreements'' (Wilson et al. 2004) . Few relevant articles were found summarizing issues under consideration, and a broadly representative article was selected. Overall, due to the directed nature of these Web site searches and the need not to cull from multiple competing sources, complete reports or articles were selected for consideration in our analysis, with each source reviewed and accepted for directness, (lack of) bias, (lack of) error, and consistency in reporting (Palys 2003, 251) .
Relevant priority setting data were analyzed within the context of the ethical framework of A4R (Martin, Shulman, et al. 2003) . A4R was used as a lens to analyze priority setting data along relevant conditions or domains, providing a normative basis for assessing fairness of priority setting.
This study completes an interdisciplinary approach to priority setting in Ontario hospitals, emphasizing ethical, leadership and policy perspectives (Reeleder 2006) . The lead author (DR) was a policy analyst at the ministry while completing his doctoral requirements at the University of Toronto. Findings from this study were discussed and validated for reasonableness and reflexivity with contributing authors, two of which serve in budgetary and academic leadership capacities at the University of Toronto (VG, PAS) and one with special expertise in qualitative methods and priority setting (DKM).
DESCRIPTION OF CASE

Context
There are 154 independent hospitals in Ontario currently funded through the ministry, at an estimated cost of $11.3 billion, of a total health budget of $33 billion (Government of Ontario 2005; Reeleder et al. 2006) . Chief executive officers from each hospital report to an independent board comprised of representatives from the community. Ontario hospitals range from small, rural hospitals, to larger community hospitals, and to even larger academic hospitals responsible for complex acute care, teaching, and research. In addition, the province has specialized children's, rehabilitation, and complex continuing care facilities. Recently, the ministry has embarked on health reform involving the creation of LHINs 
Hospital Funding
Hospitals in Ontario have traditionally been funded through a mix of approaches, primarily global, but with an increasing emphasis on incremental or output-based funding. Under global funding, hospitals receive a level of funding from the ministry that is distributed across hospital programs and services more or less as the hospital sees fit, but subject to fundor constraints on protected programs and special needs. Over time, the global budget is adjusted according to changes in inflation, demographics, or the fundor's ability to pay. This approach has been criticized because it is more reflective of historical funding decisions and less of funds that are needed in a given year (Ontario Hospital Association 2004a; Standing Senate Committee 2002, 30) . In contrast, incremental funding compares actual and expected costs per equivalent weighted cases (volumes) to derive individual hospital share percentages that are multiplied by total targeted funding for calibration of incremental dollar shares to be awarded. Expected cost per volume is determined from actual cost data from hospitals adjusted for hospital size, degree of tertiary care provided, isolation status, and the like to ensure comparisons are ''apples'' with ''apples.'' Weighted case systems use a case-mix approach comparable to the Diagnosis Related Grouping remuneration approach in the United States and elsewhere. Increasing emphasis has been placed on the need for multiyear funding arrangements to ensure stability and predictability in funding.
Other priority programs (e.g., hip and knee replacements) and capital demands use volume and predetermined unit costs to determine components of share allocation. This overall funding approach is limited because certain program areas (e.g., outpatient clinics) are excluded from case-cost, and individual hospital shares are based on a ministry-targeted funding ''pot'' whose assumptions are not explicit or determined from other needs-based formulaic input and broader external stakeholder consultation. The incremental or servicebased funding approach has been the subject of deliberations by Ontario hospitals and the ministry since the early 1990s, and refinements to the basic model have been ongoing as new evidence or interpretations of relative hospital-based costs have been determined. From 1992 From -1993 From until 1997 From -1998 , hospital budgets declined by an average of 3% per year, representing a total reduction of more than $1.3 billion from hospital budgets as the previous provincial government took steps to stabilize Ontario's public finances during this period. From 1998 From -1999 From to 2002 From -2003 , the Ontario government played catch-up in hospital funding, but it has been estimated that funding has fallen as a share of Ontario's GDP from 2.8% in 1992 to 2. 
2000)
, and the Liberals, whose mandate is not complete, reform through accountability agreements, wait-time strategies, and regionalization (Local Health Integration Networks 2005) . Each government has attempted to deal with mounting pressures from the public to improve the system while keeping it affordable.
Accountability Agreements: Ontario Genesis
According to the Auditor General of Canada (2000), accountability refers to an obligation by government to demonstrate and take responsibility for system performance when measured against targets or goals. Agreements relate to priority setting in that they seek to place responsibility on hospitals for ensuring that public funding is used and distributed according to agreed purposes. Accountability agreements point to government's desire for increased emphasis on tying hospital funding to specific deliverables while committing hospitals to balancing their budgets. Agreements are an example of public policy because they are developed by governments, sometimes through legislative agendas to constrain activities of publicly funding agencies (i.e., hospitals) (Howlett and Ramesh 2003, 5; Standing Senate Committee 2002, 37) .
One-time funding to Ontario hospitals was provided in early 2004 by the government to assist hospitals experiencing deficits, so delaying or preventing threatened nursing layoffs and program reduction. Such in-year funding relief has been relatively common over the past 10 years, as hospitals, through their Ontario Hospital Association (association), successfully lobbied to bridge seemingly chronic financial shortages in their institutions. Unlike previous assistance, however, the Minister of Health (Smitherman 2004 ) emphasized the need to link additional funding with ministry hospital accountability arrangements, consistent with other recent jurisdictional efforts aimed at establishing agreements between governments and regional health authorities to contain costs and ensure performance targets were met (British Columbia Ministry of Health 2003; Office of the Auditor General of British Columbia 2003).
The government embarked on a significant legislative initiative called Bill 8, or the ''The Commitment to the Future of Medicare Act,'' concerning the meeting of broad health care principles but including an accountability objective (to) ''believe in public accountability to demonstrate that the health system is governed and managed in a way that reflects the public interest and that promotes efficient delivery of high quality health services to all Ontarians'' (Commitment to the Future of Medicare Act 2004, preamble, c. 7). This legislation provided the statutory power for government to direct ''sign-offs'' from independent hospital corporations for the meeting of specific performance targets determined by the ministry in order for hospitals to receive funding through accountability agreements linked to hospitals balancing their budgets. Although a wide variety of stakeholders were involved in the legislative process, government was less than transparent when the final legislation was drafted (Ontario Hospital Association 2004c; JPPC 2005) .
The association was initially critical of the Medicare Act for several reasons. It argued that ''accountability'' was a mutual responsibility for both hospitals and government, accountability should involve a collaborative process of public debate on the shape and substance of standards, government was confusing accountability with ''control'' or micromanagement in directing the meeting of performance targets, and nonvoluntary consent for institutional sign-offs lacked moral legitimacy. It initially argued that the ministry approach was contrary to a ''collaborative process, based on a relationship of mutual trust and respect (to ensure) that agreements are fair and realistic.'' The association also emphasized that hospitals were morally accountable to both government and the communities they served, but that the ''overarching consideration was to be responsive to the communities they serve'' (Ontario Hospital Association 2004c . Hospitals were flagged having negative financial operating positions equal to or greater than 2% of total expenses for detailed review. Hospitals were also provided with a timeline within which to sign accountability agreements for eligible institutions to receive 2004-2005 funding. Along with correspondence to individual hospitals, the ministry provided details of its balanced budget plan and interim accountability agreement expectations, indicating that hospitals would have to balance their budgets until the end of fiscal year 2006, while being provided with an overall increase in funding of 4.3% from the previous year.
Accountability agreements, authorized through the Medicare Act, covered a variety of funding uses, such as, incremental, nursing enhancement and protected services, and were primarily targeted at the meeting of caseload volumes, increasing full-time paid nursing staff hours, or ensuring funded beds were open. Hospitals with protected services, such as mental health, priority programs and specialized hospital services, funded in the previous year, were obligated to continue providing these services, and could not serve them up as candidates for reduction.
Of significance in the balanced budget provision was the prioritization framework developed by the ministry in which hospitals were to consider a seven-step approach in determining where efficiencies should be made, with the aim of reducing administrative inefficiencies or ''low-hanging fruit'' prior to reduction in clinical programs in order to preserve patient care. ''The focus of the plan (was) on expense management, rather than on service or volume reductions'' (figure 1).
The association responded to an August 2004 ministry funding announcement saying that hospitals faced a deficit far larger than announced funding could cover, suggesting that overall increased demand in services was closer to 7.9% of costs (Ontario Hospital Association 2004b). It argued that low-hanging fruit was not available, saying administrative efficiencies had long been culled, and was of the view that hospitals had not been consulted about details of the accountability and balanced budget process. Furthermore, it pointed to examples of ''unprotected services'' that were at risk for elimination or reduction, including aboriginal health, diabetic clinics, and medical beds, among others, because of the emphasis on keeping protected services at the expense of others.
Others objected that it made little sense for the government to implicitly support nursing cutbacks in some areas to meet efficiency targets at the same time it encouraged investment of nurses in others (Urquhart 2005). This dilemma was most striking in the subsequent infusion of one-time or transitional funding to complement the summer announcement, when the ministry went on record to support appropriate uses of funding for nursing severance packages resulting from layoffs in nondesignated areas.
Government appeared to modify its approach for dealing with hospitals upon meeting continuing hospital stakeholder resistance regarding the accountability agreements. The ministry subsequently engaged experts in the field and other hospital leaders for input and established mandates for these stakeholders to validate review criteria and tools and review accountability agreements for individual hospitals. The specific outcome of these deliberations, including final recommendations to hospitals from the ministry, was not part of the public record. Evidence showed, however, that rhetoric from hospital stakeholders after ministry-led consultation was less confrontational than original communications had suggested, using collaborative, nonargumentative language (e.g., ''mutually negotiated accountability agreements,'' ''learning experiences'') to describe this second phase of agreement development (Short 2005) .
This case study is limited, first, because it represents the perspectives of the authors and may not correspond to the views of priority setting participants-the Ministry of Health or hospital stakeholders. However, documentary evidence for this review was accessed from the public domain, validated through the eyes of the authors' familiar with Ontario health reform initiatives, and consistent with related hospital priority setting research. Second, findings may not necessarily be generalizable to other jurisdictional design and implementation processes. As Yin (1994, 10) says, however, a goal of case study is to expand and generalize theory, not statistical generalization. Evidence is organized in this study using the ethical framework of A4R, which has been found useful in other hospital case studies (Bell et al. 2004; Gibson, Martin, and Singer 2005; Martin, Shulman, et al. 2003) , and there is little a priori reason to believe this process is not transferable to government. Additional empirical research in unpacking the ''black box'' of government decision making would be helpful in extending the primary finding of this study-that opportunities exist to improve the fairness and legitimacy of government decision making using the ethical framework of A4R.
ANALYSIS Alignment with A4R
A4R is an ethical framework for guiding an analysis of the fairness of priority setting, using the conditions of relevance, publicity, revision/appeals, and enforcement. In this case, was accountability agreement decision making led by the ministry conducted fairly and what can we say about its assessment using the conditions of A4R?
Relevance
Other than at the conclusion of decision making in the first year of Ontario's implementation of accountability agreements in which a committee of hospital stakeholders was established to review individual hospital claims, could it be reasonably claimed that a deliberative consultative process was utilized for decision making. The evidence shows that government did not engage initially in a deliberative process, neither involving diverse, representative hospital stakeholders nor providing a representative forum for which cost reduction ideas, targets, and their implications and rationales could be discussed openly (JPPC 2005; Ontario Hospital Association 2004a , 2004b , 2004c . For example, early on, evidenced from government top-down communications and subsequent legislation, it appeared that government was less interested in pursuing voluntary accountability agreements with hospitals by nature difficult and time-consuming than with achieving timely deliverables to meet its fiscal agenda. However, through government's later actions in enhancing stakeholder involvement through establishment of various review committees and regional consultation processes, it appeared to achieve reasonable stakeholder buy-in (Short 2005; Smitherman 2005) .
Also, during the early phase of decision making, government appeared more focused on obtaining efficiency benchmarks than on effectiveness, scope, and quality of hospital services, but this view seemed to change (JPPC 2005; Urquhart 2005) . For example, in responding to government demand for accountability and balanced budget plans, some hospital stakeholders may have produced plans unnecessarily streamlined, focused on meeting their perceived core services' demand rather than considering relevant local community demand, without appropriate consultation from affected stakeholders. Although this may have been the ''right'' system goal, without an accompanying deliberative open process involving government, hospitals, and the community, this important debate concerning what was right for the system versus the community was forgone, at least in this initial stage of decision making. With establishment of a more inclusive process later on, greater attention was placed on health system agreement on service benchmarks (e.g., volumes of services), multiyear funding predictability, and meeting of hospital balanced budget goals.
In summary, this analysis shows that government only partially met the relevance condition of A4R. Hospital stakeholders could have been more inclusively involved throughout deliberations. Relevant reasons from ''fair-minded'' individuals were not sought consistently for establishment of accountability agreements. However, there was evidence of policy learning 2 and movement toward the establishment of deliberative, inclusive stakeholder arrangements as the process matured. By limiting participation from stakeholders in the early phase of policy making, government risked being overly directive. Agreements acquire legitimacy through deliberation by fair-minded parties, but less so through institutional fiat.
Publicity
Government, evidence suggested, did not establish an open, consultative process, emphasizing transparency and reason-giving at the beginning of decision making, but progressed toward meeting this goal, upon meeting stakeholder resistance (JPPC 2005) . Government initially provided correspondence to individual hospital stakeholders, explaining its cost reduction goals and relationship to meeting of accountability targets and hospital-funding allocations. Some of this information became public knowledge with various media and association reporting, but it was not directly or comprehensively reported through a medium such as a government Internet Web site. Government and the hospital sector moved toward greater publicity in their accountability deliberations, particularly with establishment of various regional forums and committees in which directions and rationales were discussed in public forums, and were made publicly accessible (on Web sites). Government summaries of information showing planned realignments (or in some cases, reduction) were not provided to the public through reports or Web sites. It was also not clear whether individual hospitals had revealed planned service reduction to their communities in order to meet their government-directed targets. Therefore, in summary, our analysis suggested that government only partially met requirements for satisfaction of the publicity condition of A4R, only moving to greater public transparency as decision making unfolded.
Revision/Appeals
Government appeared not to encourage a meaningful two-way dialogue with hospitals with initial funding and accountability agreement notification but rather provided top-down communications, without an apparent adequate explanation of cost rationales or evidence of public consultation in their explicit communications (JPPC 2005) . There was also minimal evidence to suggest that the public or community were provided an opportunity to change system or local priorities during this earlier phase. Subsequently, however, various representative committees were appointed by government through discussions with the hospital sector and tasked to validate review criteria, to establish panel review and for peer review purposes, after individual hospital submissions were received. The specific outcomes of these deliberations, including their recommendations to government, and subsequent government decision making were not available in the public record. For example, it was not public knowledge whether originally submitted hospital plans were accepted or whether individual hospitals were provided an opportunity to change their submission in order to increase its acceptability. Our analysis, therefore, reveals that government did not meet the revision/appeals condition. 2 We refer to policy learning in the context of Howlett and Ramesh (2003) , citing Heclo (1974) , that learning is what government does in response to a new situation on the basis of past experience. Policy learning is contrasted with social learning (Hall 1993) , which is usually about policy goals themselves.
Enforcement
The enforcement condition is contingent on the other three conditions of A4R being satisfactorily addressed, which, our analysis has shown, were only partially met. Rather than seeking to meet its objectives through a collaborative planning process, government used a formal, legislative agenda for promulgation of accountability and balanced budgets (Ontario Hospital Association 2004b) . Nevertheless, government involved hospitals in agreement deliberations through committee, after it had received individual submissions (JPPC 2005) . It is our view that government had a leadership role to ensure legitimate hospital concerns were reviewed and to create an open deliberative process with various interested stakeholders, starting at the legislative phase, moving to the establishment of balanced budget public policy, and following through with a revision/appeals process for negotiating individual and hospital system claims. Government chose, however, to exercise this leadership role and follow an inclusive policy path only in the later stages of deliberation. Our analysis reveals therefore that government did not meet the enforcement condition of A4R.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This analysis makes two contributions to the priority setting literature. First, it contributes to knowledge by providing an analysis of accountability agreement implementation using A4R while also pointing to the conflict facing government policy for hospital accountability agreements striving to achieve both quality and efficiency. Second, our analysis contributes to good practices by suggesting that government has room for improvement in meeting the conditions of A4R for accountability agreement design and implementation while also pointing to an opportunity for government, through regional structures (i.e., LHINs), to improve the fairness of its priority setting for its hospitals.
First, this is the only study we are aware of that has analyzed government priority setting for hospitals using the A4R framework to assess fairness of priority setting. Although studies have described what is happening in hospitals in real-world contexts, both from individual and system perspectives, with a view of evaluating and improving priority setting practices for strategic planning, surgery, critical care, SARS, overall system fairness, and CEO-based leadership (Bell et al. 2004; Madden et al. 2005; Martin, Shulman, et al. 2003; Martin, Singer, and Bernstein 2003; Martin, Walton, and Singer 2003; Mielke, Martin, and Singer 2003; Reeleder et al. 2005 Reeleder et al. , 2006 , they have not emphasized how government sets the context for decision making for its funded agencies (i.e., hospitals). Regarding government priority setting in Canada, describe a preoccupation on financial, private sector involvement and ''core basket of services'' deliberations but do not provide specific advice on how well government meets its A4R (ethical) obligations for hospitals.
Moreover, our study points to the conflict facing government policy striving to achieve both quality and efficiency. Stone (2002, 61) argues that efficiency is a ''value'' and always a contestable concept, with people generally supporting the idea, but having difficulty going beyond vague slogans to concrete policy choices involving assumptions on what is important and to whom it is important. Government seeking significant efficiency benefits with individual hospitals must reconcile conflicting goals, such as layoffs involving clinical staff (e.g., nurses) in nonessential areas only to rehire in others, reducing housekeeping staff as part of regular building maintenance who are also important in infection control, and reducing administration involved in strategy and system control in which only minor savings can be realized in contrast to clinical program reductions in which services could be compromised but yielding greater cost savings. In the absence of consensus on which programs to reduce, hospitals may look at across-the-board reductions, which, although appearing equitable to some (i.e., equal versus targeted sharing of hardships), also serve to avoid or delay difficult decision making.
Second, this analysis suggests opportunities for government to improve the fairness of its decision-making process. By opening up the black box of decision making, we believe government can inspire trust and confidence among stakeholders. In respecting the publicity condition, government could revise its policies on confidentiality and make an effort to be as transparent as possible with regard to disclosure of reasons and supporting evidence for accountability agreements in local communities while publicly describing perceived need and service gaps within an overall health system planning framework recognizing local requirements. Moreover, government could also provide reasons or rationales for decisions to different audiences of stakeholders including the public and hospitals through various venues such as ministry-speaking engagements, public Web sites, or public forums (Daniels and Sabin 2002; Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 114) .
In enhancing the relevance and revision/appeals conditions, government could, first, commit to engaging relevant stakeholders from different perspectives throughout priority setting processes with a view of remaining open to policy options and flexible to directional change based on evidence or values. Second, government could keep the doors of decision making open as long as possible to stakeholders along critical junctures when crucial decisions were being made (Ellington 2004; Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 129) . Although policy doors should remain open for purposes of democratic deliberation (Daniels and Sabin 2002; Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 153) , it has been argued that at some point decision making may require that doors be closed in order for government to reach an uncontested decision, otherwise mandates may not be achieved (Deber and Williams 1995; Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 35; Schattschneider 1975, xi) . In this regard, additional empirical and philosophical study is required to provide guidance on what actual government practices are, and how these practices may be accommodated within our A4R framework. Third, policy design efforts could be made to ensure agreements are based on voluntary exchange of ideas and values, with stakeholders minimizing power differentials (Gibson, Martin, and Singer 2005) . Fourth, both government and its funded institutions have an opportunity to build trust with each other through demonstration of fair practices, the former through predictable and stable funding over time based on meeting deliverables in publicly available agreements and the latter through application of funding received from government for the purposes expressed in these agreements while meeting the needs of its community.
Regarding the enforcement condition, there is an opportunity, through legislative change or government policy, for government to show leadership by creating obligations for ministries of health and their hospital partners to comply with the three conditions of A4R-relevance, publicity, and revision/appeals-in order to ensure fairness of its priority setting .
In addition, our analysis points to an opportunity for government through local integration structures (e.g., LHINs) to improve accountability and subsequent fairness of its priority setting for its hospitals. We argue that LHIN leadership can use A4R to ensure fair priority setting. There are several benefits from implementation of an A4R strategy in LHINs. First, a key activity of LHINs will be priority setting, the shaping and consolidation of programs and services from hospitals and other providers within their LHIN-assigned geographical areas, using a limited budget allocated from the Ministry of Health for distribution by LHINs to local providers to ensure appropriate service delivery. A key goal of this priority setting will be fairness, with A4R offering an internationally accepted framework for fair priority setting. Second, consistent use of a common framework within and between LHINs supported by the Ministry of Health provides a unique opportunity for LHINs to engage in organizational learning and cultural change with their various communities. Expectations for stakeholder engagement, deliberation and inclusivity, evidence-based approaches, quality management, effective leadership, and open and transparent communications could be coordinated, understood, and met within a single unifying ethical framework. Third, adoption of A4R for an extended public sector organization, LHINs, establishes a living laboratory to evaluate improvements of fairness and transparency of decision making for hospitals and other providers, which may be adopted ''upstream'' by government to improve the fairness of its decision making. Finally, the risk of formally adopting A4R as a public framework seems minimal or negligible, in additional resources, foregone opportunities, or political embarrassment (Ham and Coulter 2003, 14; Ham and McIver 2000; Ham and Pickard 1998; Holm 1998) , whereas the suggested benefits of greater transparency, democratic deliberation, effective leadership, fairness of priority setting, and improved quality management appear both feasible and highly desirable (Daniels and Sabin 2002; Gibson, Martin, and Singer 2004, 2005; Martin, Pater, and Singer 2001; Martin, Giacomini, and Singer 2002; Martin, Shulman, et al. 2003; Martin, Singer, and Bernstein 2003; Reeleder et al. 2005 Reeleder et al. , 2006 Singer et al. 2000) .
Canadian provinces and territories are generally at different stages with regard to implementation of accountability agreements with their health care organizations and other transfer payment recipients. More broadly, government institutions everywhere are seeking to enhance accountability by more effectively aligning funding with results. A key part of this global trend toward greater accountability will include increased attention to issues of transparency, stakeholder engagement, and democratic deliberation. This case study provides a guide for government to enhance accountability by focusing on A4R to improve the fairness of its priority setting.
